عن الملكية الفكرية التدريب في مجال الملكية الفكرية إذكاء الاحترام للملكية الفكرية التوعية بالملكية الفكرية الملكية الفكرية لفائدة… الملكية الفكرية و… الملكية الفكرية في… معلومات البراءات والتكنولوجيا معلومات العلامات التجارية معلومات التصاميم الصناعية معلومات المؤشرات الجغرافية معلومات الأصناف النباتية (الأوبوف) القوانين والمعاهدات والأحكام القضائية المتعلقة بالملكية الفكرية مراجع الملكية الفكرية تقارير الملكية الفكرية حماية البراءات حماية العلامات التجارية حماية التصاميم الصناعية حماية المؤشرات الجغرافية حماية الأصناف النباتية (الأوبوف) تسوية المنازعات المتعلقة بالملكية الفكرية حلول الأعمال التجارية لمكاتب الملكية الفكرية دفع ثمن خدمات الملكية الفكرية هيئات صنع القرار والتفاوض التعاون التنموي دعم الابتكار الشراكات بين القطاعين العام والخاص أدوات وخدمات الذكاء الاصطناعي المنظمة العمل في الويبو المساءلة البراءات العلامات التجارية التصاميم الصناعية المؤشرات الجغرافية حق المؤلف الأسرار التجارية مستقبل الملكية الفكرية أكاديمية الويبو الندوات وحلقات العمل إنفاذ الملكية الفكرية WIPO ALERT إذكاء الوعي اليوم العالمي للملكية الفكرية مجلة الويبو دراسات حالة وقصص ناجحة في مجال الملكية الفكرية أخبار الملكية الفكرية جوائز الويبو الأعمال الجامعات الشعوب الأصلية الأجهزة القضائية الشباب الفاحصون الموارد الوراثية والمعارف التقليدية وأشكال التعبير الثقافي التقليدي الاقتصاد التمويل الأصول غير الملموسة المساواة بين الجنسين الصحة العالمية تغير المناخ سياسة المنافسة أهداف التنمية المستدامة التكنولوجيات الحدودية التطبيقات المحمولة الرياضة السياحة الموسيقى ركن البراءات تحليلات البراءات التصنيف الدولي للبراءات أَردي – البحث لأغراض الابتكار أَسبي – معلومات متخصصة بشأن البراءات قاعدة البيانات العالمية للعلامات مرصد مدريد قاعدة بيانات المادة 6(ثالثاً) تصنيف نيس تصنيف فيينا قاعدة البيانات العالمية للتصاميم نشرة التصاميم الدولية قاعدة بيانات Hague Express تصنيف لوكارنو قاعدة بيانات Lisbon Express قاعدة البيانات العالمية للعلامات الخاصة بالمؤشرات الجغرافية قاعدة بيانات الأصناف النباتية (PLUTO) قاعدة بيانات الأجناس والأنواع (GENIE) المعاهدات التي تديرها الويبو ويبو لكس - القوانين والمعاهدات والأحكام القضائية المتعلقة بالملكية الفكرية معايير الويبو إحصاءات الملكية الفكرية ويبو بورل (المصطلحات) منشورات الويبو البيانات القطرية الخاصة بالملكية الفكرية مركز الويبو للمعارف الاتجاهات التكنولوجية للويبو مؤشر الابتكار العالمي التقرير العالمي للملكية الفكرية معاهدة التعاون بشأن البراءات – نظام البراءات الدولي ePCT بودابست – نظام الإيداع الدولي للكائنات الدقيقة مدريد – النظام الدولي للعلامات التجارية eMadrid الحماية بموجب المادة 6(ثالثاً) (الشعارات الشرفية، الأعلام، شعارات الدول) لاهاي – النظام الدولي للتصاميم eHague لشبونة – النظام الدولي لتسميات المنشأ والمؤشرات الجغرافية eLisbon UPOV PRISMA الوساطة التحكيم قرارات الخبراء المنازعات المتعلقة بأسماء الحقول نظام النفاذ المركزي إلى نتائج البحث والفحص (CASE) خدمة النفاذ الرقمي (DAS) WIPO Pay الحساب الجاري لدى الويبو جمعيات الويبو اللجان الدائمة الجدول الزمني للاجتماعات WIPO Webcast وثائق الويبو الرسمية أجندة التنمية المساعدة التقنية مؤسسات التدريب في مجال الملكية الفكرية الدعم المتعلق بكوفيد-19 الاستراتيجيات الوطنية للملكية الفكرية المساعدة في مجالي السياسة والتشريع محور التعاون مراكز دعم التكنولوجيا والابتكار نقل التكنولوجيا برنامج مساعدة المخترعين WIPO GREEN WIPO's PAT-INFORMED اتحاد الكتب الميسّرة اتحاد الويبو للمبدعين WIPO Translate أداة تحويل الكلام إلى نص مساعد التصنيف الدول الأعضاء المراقبون المدير العام الأنشطة بحسب كل وحدة المكاتب الخارجية مناصب الموظفين المناصب خلاف مناصب الموظفين المشتريات النتائج والميزانية التقارير المالية الرقابة
Arabic English Spanish French Russian Chinese
القوانين المعاهدات الأحكام التصفح بحسب الاختصاص القضائي

الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

US125-j

Mondis Technology Ltd v. LG Electronics, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 3d 482 (D.N.J. 2019)

Machine translation
close
tranlsation detector

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD,

Plaintiff,                           : Civil Action No. 15-4431 (SRC)

v.

:       OPINION & ORDER

LG ELECTRONICS, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), by Defendants LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”). Plaintiff Mondis Technology Ltd (“Mondis”) opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

On October 25, 2018, LG filed a first motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. LG argued, in short, that Mondis does not hold legal title to the ‘180 patent, pursuant to Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and lacks prudential standing to sue LG on its own. In opposition, Mondis disagreed, but argued in the alternative that any defect in prudential standing could be easily cured by allowing it to join putative patent owner Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. (“Hitachi”). On December 12, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the motion and gave leave to Mondis to file an amended complaint which joined Hitachi as a party to the case. This Court subsequently denied the motion to dismiss as moot. The FAC, filed January 8, 2019, added Hitachi as a co-plaintiff.

LG then filed the instant motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. LG argues, in short, that Hitachi cannot be a named plaintiff because it lacks constitutional standing to sue LG. LG contends that the FAC should be dismissed because Mondis, alone, does not have both constitutional and prudential standing.1

The instant motion builds on the arguments made in the prior motion. LG’s argument can be broken into two parts: 1) as previously argued, the Court should recharacterize the October 30, 2007 transaction between Hitachi and Mondis to find that there was no effective transfer of legal title to the ‘180 patent to Mondis, pursuant to Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 1071, 1077 (1967),2 and its progeny, and therefore Hitachi retains the legal title; and 2) Hitachi transferred to Mondis its right to sue LG for infringement and therefore lacks constitutional standing to be in this case. LG argues that, because Mondis lacks prudential standing and Hitachi lacks constitutional standing, neither Plaintiff has standing to pursue this case, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

For the sake of discussion only, this Court will consider LG’s first proposition to be correct: the 2007 transaction, although labeled a sale of the ‘180 patent, was ineffective as an assignment of the ‘180 patent, and Hitachi retains legal title. Even if this proposition is taken as true, LG must still demonstrate that the second proposition is true, and it has not done so. The problem for LG is that it has inserted into the law a new requirement that Hitachi fails: the holder of legal title to the patent must show constitutional standing to be joined, pursuant to Rule 19, to a suit for damages against an infringer. LG has shown no controlling authority to support this proposed requirement.

LG’s proposed new requirement holds that, when a licensee seeks to join, pursuant to Rule 19, the entity holding legal title to a patent as a party to the case to remedy a defect in prudential standing, the Court must first test that owner for constitutional standing. And not just any constitutional standing, but an infringement injury-in-fact. The problem for LG is that it has not demonstrated that the Federal Circuit has expressly established this requirement or that it is implicit in its jurisprudence. This Court finds no controlling authority for the proposition that it must test the patent owner for constitutional standing before allowing joinder under these circumstances. The cases all but state that no such requirement exists. Consider the statement of the “general rule” in Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted, emphasis added):

Although an exclusive licensee may have standing to participate in a patent infringement suit, in some cases it must still be joined in suit by the patent owner.

In Independent Wireless, the Supreme Court held that, where a patent infringement suit was brought by an exclusive licensee, the patent owner was an indispensable party who was required to be joined, either voluntarily as a plaintiff or involuntarily (by process) as a defendant, in order to satisfy the requirements of standing. The holding of Independent Wireless was incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 with the adoption of Rule 19.

As a general rule, this court continues to adhere to the principle set forth in Independent Wireless that a patentee should be joined, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in any infringement suit brought by an exclusive licensee.

However, this general rule – which we recognize as being prudential rather than constitutional in nature – is subject to an exception. The exception is that, where the patentee makes an assignment of all substantial rights under the patent, the assignee may be deemed the effective “patentee” under 35 U.S.C. § 281 and thus may have standing to maintain an infringement suit in its own name.

Note that the Federal Circuit held that the prudential standing problem could be solved by joining the patent owner either as a plaintiff or as a defendant.3 This necessarily implies that the joined owner need not meet requirements specific to plaintiffs.

To restate what the Federal Circuit held in Prima Tek: 1) in Independent Wireless,4 the Supreme Court established the general rule that a patentee should be joined in any infringement suit brought by an exclusive licensee; and 2) this general rule is prudential rather than constitutional in nature. This makes clear that these principles do not invoke or rely on constitutional requirements, such as the case-or-controversy requirement. The Supreme Court has described prudential standing requirements as “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Because they are judicially self-imposed limits, they do not invoke constitutional requirements.5

This understanding is supported by the Federal Circuit’s explanation of the policy rationales underlying the general rule: “principally, from the standpoint of an accused infringer, avoidance of multiple lawsuits and liabilities, and, from the standpoint of the patentee, ensuring that its patent is not invalidated or held unenforceable without its participation.” Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co., 399 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Both of these fundamental policy concerns stem from prudential considerations, not constitutional requirements. Constitutional standing permits the exclusive licensee to bring suit for infringement, but not to bring suit alone. As outlined above, the law allows that, under certain circumstances, the holder of legal title to the patent should be joined as an indispensable party, pursuant to Rule 19.

LG has shown no authority for the proposition that the Court, in exercising its authority under Rule 19, must re-apply the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement before allowing joinder. Nor has LG cited any Federal Circuit case in which the Court, examining the joinder of a patent owner, required a showing of an injury-in-fact by the owner. There is no controlling authority for the proposition that a licensee who joins a patent owner to satisfy prudential requirements must demonstrate that the owner has constitutional standing.

In sum, the Court finds that if, for the purpose of consideration of this motion only, we take LG’s first proposition as true – that the 2007 transaction failed to transfer legal title in the ‘180 patent from Hitachi to Mondis, and that the Court casts aside the parties’ labels and concludes that, in effect, Hitachi retained legal title and Mondis emerged in the position of an exclusive licensee from the 2007 transaction – , there is a well-worn path in Federal Circuit law to resolve the resultant prudential standing problem: Mondis, pursuant to Rule 19, joins Hitachi as an indispensable party. LG argues unpersuasively that Mondis is barred from that well-worn path by a constitutional standing requirement that has gone unmentioned in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. This Court today does not decide any questions about the theory that the 2007 transaction should be recharacterized, but holds that, even if that theory is correct, Rule 19 authorizes a solution to the potential prudential standing problem. Mondis solved the potential prudential standing problem when it joined Hitachi as a plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 19. Mondis has now met the constitutional and prudential requirements for standing. The motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied.

LG argues that, should the Court decline to dismiss the FAC, it should reset the clock on damages based on the date of filing the FAC, on a theory that Rule 15 requires it. LG is incorrect. The FAC did not change Mondis’ claims for damages.6 As LG knows well, Hitachi has no right to sue LG for infringement of the ‘180 patent. Relation back is not an issue here. LG’s request that this Court reset the damages clock in some way is denied.

For these reasons,

IT IS on this 26th day of February, 2019

ORDERED that LG’s motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Docket Entry No. 379) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Mondis shall file a further amended complaint to restore the original allegation as to the date of notice.

s/ Stanley R. Chesler

Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.

1

Mondis and LG do not dispute that Mondis has constitutional standing to sue LG for patent infringement.

2

“[I]n order that a transfer constitute a sale, there must be a grant of all substantial rights of value in the patent. The transfer of anything less is a license which conveys no proprietary interest to the licensee.” Id.

3

The Supreme Court, in Independent Wireless, stated the same.

4

“The presence of the owner of the patent as a party is indispensable not only to give jurisdiction under the patent laws but also, in most cases, to enable the alleged infringer to respond in one action to all claims of infringement for his act, and thus either to defeat all claims in the one action, or by satisfying one adverse decree to bar all subsequent actions.” Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926).

5

Similarly, in WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit stated: “An exclusive licensee generally must join the patent owner to the suit to satisfy prudential standing constraints . . .” The Court stated no constitutional requirements or considerations.

In Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost US, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit characterized the case law as follows:

We explained that the requirement that the exclusive licensee must normally join the patent owner in any suit on the patent is a “prudential” requirement, not a constitutional requirement based on Article III limitations, and that an action brought by the exclusive licensee alone may be maintained as long as the licensee joins the patent owner in the course of the litigation.

Note that the final clause states only one condition for the maintenance of an action for infringement brought by an exclusive licensee: the patent owner must be joined in the course of the litigation. No constitutional requirement is stated, and the Court affirmatively declared that this is not a constitutional requirement.

6

LG points out that there is one material change related to the damages claim: the factual allegation regarding the date of notice of infringement. The original Complaint alleges: “LG has had knowledge of the ’180 patent since no later than March 9, 2009.” (Compl. ¶ 60.) The FAC alleges: “LG has had knowledge of the ‘180 patent since January 15, 2009.” (FAC ¶ 30.) The Court will not permit this modification and Mondis shall file a further amended complaint to restore the original allegation as to the date of notice.