Date of
Judgment:
11.04.2000
Issuing
Authority: Supreme Court
Level of
the Issuing Authority: Final Instance
Type of
Procedure: Judicial (Civil)
Subject
Matter: Patent,
Design, Trademarks
Main
text of the judgment (decision):
1. Jokoku
appeal is dismissed.
2.
Appellant shall bear the costs of the Jokuku appeal.
Reasons:
Concerning
the First, Second, and Fourth Grounds of the Appeal by the Appellant's
attorneys Minoru Nakamura, Sadao Kumakura, Koichi Tsujii, Shinichiro Tanaka,
Tadahito Orita, and assistants A, B, C and D:
1.
Appellee seeks dismissal of Appellant's claim for damages, wherein Appellant
asserts that Appellee's manufacture and sales of semi-conductor devices
specified in Schedule (I) and Schedule (Ro) "List of Items" in the
decision of the District Court constitutes infringement of patent, as described
below.
The
outline of facts as conclusively found by the Court of Appeals is as stated
below. This Court affirms that judgment and rejects Appellant's claim of error
in the findings.
(1)
Appellant owns Patent No. 320275 (hereinafter "the Texas-Instrument Patent")
for an invention entitled "Semi-conductor Device (hereinafter " the
Invention").
(2)
The Invention was a derivative application dated December 21, 1971 (hereinafter
" the Application"), which itself was a derivative application from
an original invention (hereinafter "Original Invention") of patent
application dated January 30, 1964, Patent No. 4869 (hereinafter "the
Original Application"), which itself was a derivative application for an
invention from an original application dated February 6, 1960 (Patent No.
3745).
(3)
Patent was not granted in the Original Application since it was conclusively
shown that the Original Invention could be easily created based on inventions
already in the public domain, i.e.,prior art rendered the Original Invention
invalid for obviousness.
(4) The Invention and the Original Invention are
substantially the same.
(5) The Appellee is in the business of manufacturing and
selling semi-conductor devices, as specified in Schedule (I) and Schedule (Ro)
"List of Items" in the District Court's decision .
2. Relying on the finding of facts stated above, the Court of
Appeals found as follows:
(1) If the Application were a valid derivative claim of the
Original Application, the Application would be regarded as having been filed at
the same time the Original Application was filed, as provided in Article 9,
paragraph 1 of the Patent Act then in effect (thereafter, abolished by Act No.
122 of 1959). However, because the Application was not found to be a derivative
application, it is regarded as having been filed for the same invention as the
Original Invention but on a later date than the application for the Original
Invention. Accordingly, it is extremely likely the Patent will be judged
invalid and the application denied, as stipulated under Article 39, paragraph 1
of the Patent Act.
(2) In addition, the Invention is substantially the same as
the Original Invention covered by the Original Application, and a patent was
not granted in the Original Application since it was conclusively shown that
prior art rendered the Original Invention invalid for obviousness.
Accordingly, the Patent is likely to be deemed invalid in
this regard, too.
(3) To grant Appellant's motion for injunction against a
third party based on a claim of infringement of the Patent, which would likely
to be deemed invalid, would be an extension of rights beyond the scope
contemplated under the act.
3. Appellant, in addition to asserting that 2 (1) and (2) in
the Judgment of the Court of Appeals are erroneous, contends that the Court of
Appeals refusal to grant the patent rested on inadequate examination and was
supported by insufficient reasoning and is therefore a violation of the act,
since in that same Judgment it was determined that the Patent is de facto
invalid notwithstanding that, in a patent infringement proceeding, judicial
review must give due weight to the presumption of validity and render judgment
only on whether or not the item in question is covered by the technical scope
of a patent.
4. Despite Appellant's arguments above, the Court of Appeals
findings in 2(1) and (2) are sustained. In this case, the grounds for rejecting
the Original Application as prior were clear and convincing. Nonetheless, even
if a prior application is conclusively rejected, it does not necessitate loss
of status as a prior application (cf. Article 2, paragraph of 4 of Supplemental
Provisions of Act No. 51 of 1998, and the Patent Act, paragraph 5 prior to
revision by the above). The Application, however, should be rejected under
Patent Act, Article 39, paragraph 1 (cf. 2nd Petty Bench Judgment 1991 (Gyo
Tsu) No. 139 of February 24, 1995, Supreme Court Civil Report Vol. 49, No. 2,
p. 460). In addition, the Patent was granted in violation of the Patent Act,
Article 29, paragraph 2, because the Invention is substantially the same as the
Original Invention for which grant of patent was conclusively rejected on the
grounds that the Original Invention was easily created based on prior art
already in the public domain.
Thus, substantial and convincing grounds exist for
invalidating the Patent as specified in Article 123, paragraph2 (2) of the
Patent Act, and no special circumstances exist in this case, such as pendency
of a claim for modification, which would warrant a different conclusion.
Accordingly, it is highly foreseeable that the Patent will be invalidated.
(According to the records, a decision invalidating the Patent was rendered by
the Patent Office on November 19, 1997 after the Court of Appeal's judgement
was issued and currently a lawsuit for reversal of the decision is pending.)
5. We next turn to 2 (3) in the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Article 123, paragraph 1 and article 278 of the Patent Act
provides that a magistrate of the Patent Office with professional knowledge and
experience in the field, shall be responsible for rendering a decision to
invalidate a patent, accompanied by reasons for such invalidation. In the case
where a conclusive decision of invalidity is reached, such patent is regarded
as having not existed at all (Patent Act, Article 125). Until that time,
however, a patent retains its validity and enforceability and is not publicly
invalidated.
Notwithstanding, for the following reasons it is improper for
the courts to entertain a claim for injunction, damages, or other claims based
on a patent that would in all probability be found invalid, as would likely be
the case should a claim to invalidate The Patent under consideration here be
filed.
1 Substantively, to accept a claim for injunction, damages,
or other claims based on a patent of dubious validity would grant such patent
owner unfair profit and unfairly disadvantage others working on the invention.
Such result violates the principle of equity; 2 When possible, it is best to
settle a dispute simply and quickly in a single proceeding. If the defendant is
not allowed to assert reasons for invalidating the patent as a defense against
the exercise of patent right in a patent infringement proceeding such as the
one before this Court, the defendant will then be forced initiate invalidation
proceedings in the Patent Office to obtain a conclusive decision of
invalidation even if the defendant had not intended to pursue such avenues to
render the patent publicly invalidated. Such an outcome would conflict with the
principle of judicial economy; and 3 Article 168, paragraph 2 of the Patent Act
cannot be interpreted as requiring the cessation of proceedings even in a case
where evidence for invalidating the patent is apparent and invalidation of the
patent concerned is a certain and foreseeable likelihood.
Accordingly, a court considering a claim of patent
infringement should be capable of judging whether or not there exists
sufficient reasons to invalidate the patent, even prior to the issuance of a
final decision invalidating the patent. If during the hearings the court finds
that there exists sufficient cause to invalidate the patent, a claim of
injunction, damages, or other claims based on such patent would be an extension
of rights beyond the scope contemplated under the act unless it can be
demonstrated that circumstances exist which justify special treatment. Such
interpretation is not contrary to the purposes of the patent system, and prior
decisions handed down by the Court of Cassation that differ from our
interpretation above, including Case No. 1903 (Re) 2662 of September 15, 1904
(Criminal Record No. 10, p. 1679) and Case No. 1916 (O) 1033 of April 23, 1917
(Civil Record No. 23, p. 654) are hereby reversed to the extent contrary to the
interpretation announced in the decision today.
6. Therefore, in this case where clear and convincing evidence
exists that the Patent is invalid and no extenuating circumstances, such as
pendency of a claim for modification, have been cited which could warrant a
different conclusion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals accepting Jokoku
Appellee's argument that Jokoku Appellant's claim of damages based on the
Patent would be an extension of rights beyond scope contemplated under the act
is affirmed. This Decision is not contrary to precedents referred to in Jokoku
Appellant's argument. Further, this Court does not find there has been an error
in act. Selection and evaluation of the evidence and finding of facts are the
sole provenence and discretion of the Court of Appeals; thus, contrary to
Jokoku Appellant's contentions, mere criticism of those findings cannot justify
overturning the judgment.
Other Grounds for Jokoku Appeal:
The finding of facts and judgment of the Court of Appeals
shall be affirmed in light of the evidence in the court of appeals judgment and
the records. Further, this court does not find there has been an error in act
in the conduct of proceedings. Moreover, Jokoku Appellant's strange contention
that it is inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to have sole authority and
discretion in the handling of the trial and in the selection and evaluation of
evidence and findings of facts is rejected.
Accordingly, this Court unanimously finds for Appellee.
(This translation
is provisional and subject to revision.)
(Translated
by Judicial Research Foundation)