[G.R. No. 108946. January 28, 1999.]
FRANCISCO G.
JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR.,
and CASEY FRANCISCO, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
This
is a petition for certiorari. Petitioners seek to annul the resolution
of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1992, in Criminal Case No.
Q-92-27854, entitled "Gabriel Zosa, et al. v. City Prosecutor of Quezon
City and Francisco Joaquin, Jr.," and its resolution, dated December
3, 1992, denying petitioner Joaquin's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner
BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright
No. M922, dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show
aired from 1970 to 1977.
On
June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to
its certificate of copyright specifying the show's format and style of
presentation.
On
July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr.,
president of BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which
was produced by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a
letter to private respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of
IXL, informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me and
demanding that IXL discontinue airing It's a Date.
In
a letter, dated July 19, 1991, private respondent Zosa apologized to petitioner
Joaquin and requested a meeting to discuss a possible settlement. IXL, however,
continued airing It's a Date, prompting petitioner Joaquin to send a
second letter on July 25, 1991 in which he reiterated his demand and warned
that, if IXL did not comply, he would endorse the matter to his attorneys for
proper legal action.
Meanwhile,
private respondent Zosa sought to register IXL's copyright to the first episode
of It's a Date for which it was issued by the National Library a certificate
of copyright on August 14, 1991.
Upon
complaint by petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49
was filed against private respondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN
Channel 9, namely, William Esposo, Felipe Medina, and Casey Francisco, in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
92-27854 and assigned to Branch 104 thereof. However, private respondent Zosa
sought a review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor before the
Department of Justice.
On
August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed
the Assistant City Prosecutor's findings and directed him to move for the
dismissal of the case against private respondents.
Petitioner
Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
respondent Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that:
1. The public
respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
he invoked non-presentation of the master tape as being fatal to the existence
of probable cause to prove infringement, despite the fact that private
respondents never raised the same as a controverted issue.
2. The public
respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
he arrogated unto himself the determination of what is copyrightable — an issue
which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court to
assess in a proper proceeding.
Both
public and private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish
the existence of probable cause due to their failure to present the copyrighted
master videotape of Rhoda and Me. They contend that petitioner BJPI's
copyright covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Me and that the
formats or concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright
protection under P. D. No. 49.
Non-Assignment of Error
Petitioners
claim that their failure to submit the copyrighted master videotape of the
television show Rhoda and Me was not raised in issue by private
respondents during the preliminary investigation and, therefore, it was error
for the Secretary of Justice to reverse the investigating prosecutor's finding
of probable cause on this ground.
A preliminary investigation
falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law the power
to direct and control criminal actions. He is, however, subject to the control
of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Rule
112, §4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 4. Duty
of investigating fiscal. — If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding
information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses,
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend
dismissal of the complaint.
In either case,
he shall forward the records of the case to the provincial or city fiscal or
chief state prosecutor within five (5) days from his resolution. The latter
shall take appropriate action thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, immediately informing the parties of said action.
No complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the
prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief
state prosecutor.
Where the
investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings
are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the
corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant
fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition
by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal
concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint
or information.
In
reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded
from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining
whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own
finding of probable cause and is not confined to the issues raised by the
parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not
subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
Opinion of the Secretary of
Justice
Petitioners
contend, however, that the determination of the question whether the format or
mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection is for the court, and
not the Secretary of Justice, to make. They assail the following portion of the
resolution of the respondent Secretary of Justice:
[T]he essence of
copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable
materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of P.D. No. 49. Apart
from the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a
dating game show is, in the opinion of this Office, a non-copyrightable
material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form
clearly do not fall within the class of works or materials susceptible of
copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49. (Emphasis
added.)
It
is indeed true that the question whether the format or mechanics of
petitioners' television show is entitled to copyright protection is a legal
question for the court to make. This does not, however, preclude respondent
Secretary of Justice from making a preliminary determination of this question
in resolving whether there is probable cause for filing the case in court. In
doing so in this case, he did not commit any grave error.
Presentation of Master Tape
Petitioners
claim that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
ruling that the master videotape should have been presented in order to
determine whether there was probable cause for copyright infringement. They
contend that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on
which respondent Secretary of Justice relied in reversing the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor, is inapplicable to the case at bar because in the
present case, the parties presented sufficient evidence which clearly establish
"linkages between the copyrighted show 'Rhoda and Me' and the
infringing TV show 'It's a Date.'"
The
case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation involved raids conducted on
various videotape outlets allegedly selling or renting out "pirated"
videotapes. The trial court found that the affidavits of NBI agents, given in
support of the application for the search warrant, were insufficient without
the master tape. Accordingly, the trial court lifted the search warrants it had
previously issued against the defendants. On petition for review, this Court
sustained the action of the trial court and ruled:
The presentation
of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument
to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of
application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature
and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume
that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes
that it owns.
The application
for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a
copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of
the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must
present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter
is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted
films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
This ruling was qualified in
the later case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals in
which it was held:
In fine, the
supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of
search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in
determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where
there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the
pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said
case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly
intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar
copyright infringement cases. . . .
In
the case at bar, during the preliminary investigation, petitioners and private
respondents presented written descriptions of the formats of their respective
televisions shows, on the basis of which the investigating prosecutor ruled:
As may [be]
gleaned from the evidence on record, the substance of the television
productions complainant's "RHODA AND ME" and Zosa's "IT'S A
DATE" is that two matches are made between a male and a female, both
single, and the two couples are treated to a night or two of dining and/or
dancing at the expense of the show. The major concepts of both shows is the
same. Any difference appear mere variations of the major concepts.
That there is an infringement on the copyright of the show "RHODA AND ME" both in content and in the execution of the video presentation are established because respondent's "IT'S A DATE" is practically an exact copy of complainant's "RHODA AND ME" because of substantial similarities as follows, to wit:
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"RHODA AND ME" |
"IT'S A DATE" |
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Set 1 |
Set 1 |
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a. |
Unmarried participant |
a. |
same |
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of one gender (searcher) |
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appears on one side of a |
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divider, while three (3) |
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unmarried participants |
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of the other gender are |
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on the other side of the |
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divider. This arrangement |
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is done to ensure |
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that the searcher does |
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not see the searchees. |
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b. |
Searcher asks a question |
b. |
same |
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to be answered by each of |
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the searchees. The purpose |
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is to determine who among |
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the searchees is the most |
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compatible with the searcher. |
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c. |
Searcher speculates on the |
c. |
same |
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match to the searchee. |
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d. |
Selection is made by the |
d. |
Selection is |
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use of compute (sic) methods, |
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based on the |
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or by the way questions are |
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answer of the |
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answered, or similar methods. |
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Searchees. |
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Set 2 |
Set 2 |
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Same as above with the genders |
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same |
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of the searcher and searchees |
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interchanged. |
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Petitioners
assert that the format of Rhoda and Me is a product of ingenuity and
skill and is thus entitled to copyright protection. It is their position that
the presentation of a point-by-point comparison of the formats of the two shows
clearly demonstrates the nexus between the shows and hence establishes the
existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. Such being the case,
they did not have to produce the master tape.
To
begin with, the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No.
49, otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
enumerates the classes of work entitled to copyright protection, to wit:
Section
2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works:
(A) Books,
including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, and
gazetteers;
(B) Periodicals,
including pamphlets and newspapers;
(C) Lectures,
sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;
(D) Letters;
(E) Dramatic
or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works and entertainments in
dumb shows, the acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise;
(F) Musical
compositions, with or without words;
(G) Works of
drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, and other
works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(H) Reproductions
of a work of art;
(I) Original
ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not
patentable, and other works of applied art;
(J) Maps,
plans, sketches, and charts;
(K) Drawings
or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(L) Photographic
works and works produced by a process analogous to photography; lantern slides;
(M) Cinematographic
works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audio-visual recordings;
(N) Computer
programs;
(O) Prints,
pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;
(P) Dramatizations,
translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other alterations of
literary, musical or artistic works or of works of the Philippine government as
herein defined, which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 of this
Decree.
(Q) Collections
of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in Section 9
of this Decree which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their
contents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in
accordance with Section 8 of this Decree.
(R) Other
literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.
This provision is
substantially the same as §172 of the INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). The format or mechanics of a television
show is not included in the list of protected works in §2 of P.D. No. 49.
For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover
them.
Copyright, in the
strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or
independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right
regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as
the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the
subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the
statute.
Since . . .
copyright in published works is purely a statutory creation, a copyright may be
obtained only for a work falling within the statutory enumeration or
description.
Regardless of the
historical viewpoint, it is authoritatively settled in the United States that
there is no copyright except that which is both created and secured by act of
Congress . . .
P.D.
No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to
finished works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work. Thus,
the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides:
SEC. 175. Unprotected
Subject Matter. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172 and 173,
no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system,
method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such, even
if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of
the day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of
press information; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or
legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof.
What
then is the subject matter of petitioners' copyright? This Court is of the
opinion that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each
episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of works mentioned
in P.D. 49, §2(M), to wit:
Cinematographic
works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audio-visual recordings;
The copyright does not
extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly,
by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI's copyright, the
investigating prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes
of the two shows.
Mere
description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is
insufficient; the presentation of the master videotape in evidence was
indispensable to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly
observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:
A television show
includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum
of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or
dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of
both dating game shows.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.