Date of
Judgment:
02.03.2001
Issuing
Authority: Supreme Court
Level of
the Issuing Authority: Final Instance
Type of
Procedure: Judicial (Civil)
Subject
Matter: Copyright
and Related Rights (Neighboring Rights)
Main
text of the judgment (decision):
1.
Of the judgment of prior instance, the portion concerning the appellee shall be
changed as follows:
The
judgment of the first instance shall be changed as follows:
(1)
The appellee shall pay to the appellant 7,539,239 yen and an amount calculated
at the rate of 5% per annum of the above amount for the period from March 13,
1997 to the date of payment.
(2)
All of the other claims by the appellant against the appellee shall be
dismissed.
2.
The total cost of the suit shall be divided into five equal parts, one of which
shall be borne by the appellant and the remainder by the appellee.
Reasons:
I.
The facts and other circumstances related to the case which duly became final
and binding in the judgment of prior instance is as described below:
1.
The appellant has controlled the musical works listed in the list of karaoke
songs shown in the exhibit to the judgment of the first instance and those
listed in the supplement thereto (hereinafter referred to as the “Controlled Works”)
by being assigned for trust purposes the copyrights in the Controlled Works by
the copyright holders thereof. From the time when this case occurred, the
appellant has been the sole music copyright intermediary society in Japan which
is assigned for trust purposes the copyrights in, and controls, most of the
musical works screened or played by karaoke equipment.
The
appellee is a limited company engaged in the business of renting and selling
commercial karaoke equipment in areas mainly in the southern part of Ibaraki
Prefecture. Person D is one of the partners running restaurants “E” and
“F”(hereinafter referred to as the “Restaurants”).
2.
The appellee entered into a rental contract for karaoke equipment with D for
restaurant E on September 30, 1991 and another for restaurant F on December 27,
1991 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rental Contracts”), and delivered a set
of laser disc karaoke equipment to D for each of the Restaurants. A document
for the Rental Contract contains a statement to the effect, “If the renter
intends to use the Property for business purposes, the renter is required by
the appellant to execute a copyrighted work license agreement. The renter is
asked to please handle the execution of such agreement at its responsibility.”
Although the appellee also gave an oral explanation of this requirement to D at
the time of execution of each of the Rental Contracts, the appellee failed to
confirm, before delivery of the aforementioned karaoke equipment, that D had
executed, or had made an application for the execution of, a copyrighted work
license agreement. During the periods from the respective dates of execution of
the Rental Contracts to June 8, 1995, D and his partners screened lyrics and
music that were Controlled Works at the respective Restaurants without
receiving a license from the appellant and allowed customers and employees to
sing, by playing laser discs by operating the aforementioned karaoke equipment
rented from the appellee, thereby creating ambience of the Restaurants with the
intention of increasing business profits.
3.
On or after June 9, 1995, the appellee learned that a provisional disposition
order that had been sought by the appellant prohibiting D from using the
karaoke equipment was executed on D, and it was only then the appellee became
aware that D and his partners had not executed a copyrighted work license
agreement with the appellant. However, since D covenanted that he would settle
the matter responsibly without causing trouble to the appellee, on September 9,
1995 the appellee re-entered into a rental contract for karaoke equipment with
D for each of the Restaurants and delivered a set of online karaoke equipment
to D for each of the Restaurants. Until December 20, 1996 at restaurant E and
until October 20, 1995 at restaurant F, D and his partners played songs that
were Controlled Works without receiving a license from the appellant and
allowed customers and employees to sing, by operating the aforementioned
karaoke equipment rented from the appellee, thereby creating ambience of the
Restaurants with the intention of increasing business profits.
4.
The amount receivable by the appellant from the Restaurants for their use of
works constituting Controlled Works is 73,542 yen per month per restaurant.
II.
In this case, the appellant claims against the appellee damages equivalent to
royalties, alleging that the appellee’s acts constitute a joint tort with the
copyright infringement by D and his partners.
III.
The court of prior instance found negligence on the part of the appellee for
the period in and after September 1995 and granted the appellant’s claim for
damages.
However,
the court of prior instance denied negligence on the part of appellee for the
period up to June 8, 1995, by ruling as follows:
1.
A karaoke equipment rental business operator has a general duty of care to give
consideration so that karaoke equipment will not be used as a means to infringe
copyrights. Usually, this duty of care should be deemed fulfilled if the
karaoke equipment rental business operator, at the time of execution of a
rental contract, provides the other party to the contract with oral or written
guidance to the effect that the said party is legally obligated to execute a
copyrighted work license agreement. Then, if it is reasonably foreseeable that
the other party to the contract may not execute a copyrighted work license
agreement or if exceptional circumstances exist that give rise to a suspicion
that no copyrighted work license agreement may have been executed since the
execution of the rental contract, the karaoke equipment rental business
operator must take measures to prevent copyright infringement, such as by
refraining from delivering the karaoke equipment to the other party to the
contract until a copyrighted work license agreement has been confirmed to have
been executed or by withdrawing the karaoke equipment if it has been delivered.
In general, however, the karaoke equipment rental business operator has no duty
of care to confirm, after execution of the rental contract and before delivery
of the karaoke equipment, that the other party to the contract has made an
application to the appellant for execution of a copyrighted work license
agreement or to check, from time to time after delivery of the karaoke equipment,
whether or not such agreement has been executed.
2.
A document for the Rental Contract contains a warning that a copyrighted work
license agreement should be executed with the appellant. This was also
explained orally by the appellee to D. Furthermore, it is not found that, at
the time of execution of the Rental Contract, sufficient exceptional
circumstances existed that gave rise to a suspicion that D had no intention to
execute a copyrighted work license agreement, or that, after the execution of
the Rental Contract, sufficient exceptional circumstances existed that gave
rise to a suspicion that D may have executed no copyrighted work license
agreement since the execution of the Rental Contract. For these reasons, no
breach of duty of care existed for the period up to June 8, 1995.
IV.
However, the ruling of the court of prior instance described above is not
acceptable, for the following reasons:
1.
If the owner of a restaurant or the like places at the restaurant laser disc
karaoke equipment with function of screening lyrics and music which are musical
works or online karaoke equipment with function of screening lyrics which are,
and playing pieces of music which are, musical works (hereinafter either
referred to as the “Karaoke Equipment”),
encourages customers to sing, screens or plays lyrics and pieces of music
(which are musical works) of customers’ choices by the Karaoke Equipment,
allows customers and employees to sing with the accompaniment of such pieces,
and otherwise uses the Karaoke Equipment to screen or play musical works in
order to show or play them directly to the public, thereby creating ambience
with the intention of making business profits, then such owner is, unless he
has obtained a license from the copyright holders of these musical works,
inevitably liable for a tort due to infringement of the right to perform or
screen lyrics and pieces of music as a result of his customers’ and employees’
singing and the Karaoke Equipment’s screening or playing of such lyrics and
pieces of music (see Supreme Court, 1984 (O) 1204, Judgment of the Third Petty
bench of March 15, 1988, Minshu Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 199).
2.
[Summary] It is reasonable to understand that if a Karaoke Equipment rental
business operator enters into a rental contract for Karaoke Equipment and if
such equipment is to be used exclusively to screen or play musical works in
order to show or play them directly to the public, the Karaoke Equipment rental
business operator, on the grounds of good sense, has a duty of care not only to
inform the other party to the rental contract that the said other party should
execute a copyrighted work license agreement with the copyright holders of such
musical works but also to deliver the Karaoke Equipment only after confirming
that such other party has executed, or has applied for the execution of, such a
copyrighted work license agreement with such copyright holders. This is because
such a duty of care should be affirmed when the following factors are
comprehensively taken into account: (1) considering that most of the musical
works screened or played by Karaoke Equipment are protected by copyrights,
Karaoke Equipment can generally be regarded as equipment that is likely to
cause the owner of a restaurant using Karaoke Equipment to infringe copyrights
as described in section 1 above, unless he has obtained a license from the
copyright holders of such musical works; (2) copyright infringement is a
criminal offense that violates penal provisions (Article 119 et seq. of the
Copyright Act); (3) a Karaoke Equipment rental business operator makes business
profits by renting out Karaoke Equipment which is likely to cause copyright
infringement as described above; (4) it is a commonly known fact that in
general, the owners of restaurants using Karaoke Equipment are not always
likely to execute a copyrighted work license agreement, and a Karaoke Equipment
rental business operator should foresee the likelihood of copyright
infringement unless it has been able to confirm that the other party to a
rental contract has executed, or has applied for the execution of, a
copyrighted work license agreement: and (5) a Karaoke Equipment rental business
operator can easily check whether or not the other party to a rental contract
has executed, or has applied for the execution of, a copyrighted work license
agreement and, by doing so, the Karaoke Equipment rental business operator can
take measures to prevent copyright infringement.
3.
If we apply the above arguments to this case, since it is obvious that D
intended to use the Karaoke Equipment to screen or play Controlled Works in
order to show or play them directly to the public, the appellee had a duty of
care to prevent D and his partners from infringing copyrights, by confirming,
before delivery of the Karaoke Equipment pursuant to the Rental Contract, that
they had executed, or had applied for the execution of, a copyrighted work
license agreement. However, the appellee only informed D of a requirement that
a copyrighted work license agreement be executed with the appellant and,
without confirming that D had executed, or has applied for the execution of,
such a copyrighted work license agreement, carelessly delivered the Karaoke
Equipment to D, thereby breaching the duty of care imposed on the appellee on
the grounds of good sense as described above. Since this resulted in the
copyright infringement by D and his partners, it is inevitable to find that an
adequate causation exists between the appellee’s failure to fulfill the
aforementioned duty of care and the appellant’s damage incurred by the
copyright infringement by D and his partners.
Therefore,
the above-described ruling of the court of prior instance that the appellee had
no duty of care for the period up to June 8, 1995 erred in the interpretation
and application of law, and this illegality obviously affects the conclusion of
the judgment of prior instance. The gist of the argument of the petition for
appeal is thus well-grounded.
V.
Next, we will decide on the amount of damage to be compensated for by the
appellee.
The
amount of damage incurred by the appellant is 73,542 yen per month. The
duration of the copyright infringement was, as described above: at restaurant
E, a period of 44 months and 10 days which commenced on September 30, 1991 and
ended on June 8, 1995, and a period of 15 months and 12 days which commenced on
September 9, 1995 and ended on December 20, 1996; and at restaurant F, a period
of 41 months and 13 days which commenced on December 27, 1991 and ended on June
8, 1995 and a period of one month and 12 days which commenced on September 9,
1995 and ended on October 20, 1995. Accordingly, the amount of damage incurred
by the appellant is 4,391,168 yen and 3,148,071 yen for restaurants E and F,
respectively, for a total of 7,539,239 yen (with any fraction less than one yen
resulting from the per-diem calculation being discarded).
Therefore,
the appellant’s claims against the appellee made in this case are accepted as
well-grounded to the extent of 7,539,239 yen and that payment is sought of
delay damages at the rate of 5% per annum as set in the Civil Code for the
period from March 13, 1997, which is after the date of tort, and to the date of
payment. The rest of the appellant’s claims should be dismissed as
unreasonable.
VI.
For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the first instance that is
inconstant with the above should be changed as described above and, of the
judgment of prior instance, the portion concerning the appellee shall be
changed as set forth in paragraph 1 of the main text of this judgment.
Accordingly,
the Court unanimously decides as set forth in the main text.
(This translation is
provisional and subject to revision.)